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* 
Three long-established, competing frameworks for understanding 
the law–morality relation — the individual reason-based tradition 
(represented  here  by  Rawls),  the  communitarian  tradition 
(MacIntyre and Cotterrell) and the utilitarian or positivist tradition 
(Austin and Hart) — are challenged by some research into early 
modern  thinkers  like  Hobbes,  Hale,  Pufendorf  and  Thomasius. 
More  specifically,  I  use  some  work  by  Ian  Hunter  and  David 
Saunders to present an approach to law-morality which I call the 
Australian  sceptical  approach.  I  present  and  promote  this 
approach in terms of its two main features. The first is its use of 
historical  research into a particular use of  law in early modern 
Europe, by which law was combined with a pointedly restricted 
understanding of Western morality in a bid to stop the carnage 
being caused by religious wars — wars fought over competing 
visions of morality. The second is its deployment of this and other 
historical evidence in polemics against traditions that impose on 
the past and the present an over-arching philosophical position 
about,  or  theory  of,  law-morality,  often  in  the  service  of 
arguments against the idea of law as a neutral instrument used to 
attain civil peace. 
Introduction 
At least three distinct frameworks for understanding the relation between law 
and morality have long been available to scholars concerned with the study of 
law and society.
1 One is the post-Kantian, individual reason-based framework, 
which, as its name suggests, locates morality in individual human reason and 
insists that it is this morality alone that is the foundation for law, a tradition to 
be  represented  here  by  John  Rawls.
2  Another  is  the  Aristotelian-Thomist 
communitarian framework, not without considerable Kantian influence, which 
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locates  morality  in  the  reason  of  the  community  and  insists  that  it  is  this 
morality alone that is the foundation for law, a tradition to be represented here 
by Alisdair MacIntyre
3 and Roger Cotterrell.
4 The third, pushing in a different 
direction,  is  the  utilitarian  or  positivist  framework,  which  builds  a 
philosophical wall to keep the domains of law and morality separate, to be 
represented here by John Austin
5 and HLA Hart.
6 
My  primary  aim  is  to  present  and  promote  a  fourth  distinct  means  of 
understanding law-morality, which I call the Australian sceptical approach.
7 I 
build  this approach mainly from various works by each  of Ian Hunter and 
David Saunders, though I do show how it relates to the broader history-of-
thought tradition, of which it forms a distinctive part. This broader tradition, as 
it relates to the law–morality relation, has sought for some time to focus debate 
on some early modern legal and political thinking, especially on that thinking 
concerned  to  restrict  the  devastating  effects  of  competing  moral  visions, 
usually  as  competing  faiths  or  confessions,  by  restricting  what  was  to  be 
accepted within public  life  as  morality.  The works of  Thomas Hobbes and 
Matthew  Hale,  writing  in  England  in  the  second  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century, and Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius, writing in Germany 
only slightly later in that century and, in Thomasius’s case, just into the next, 
provide good examples of this early modern thinking, though there are other 
writers from the period, like Hugo Grotius in the Netherlands, Jean Bodin in 
France and John Selden in England, who might also be mentioned. 
The  Australian  sceptical  approach  is  worth  distinguishing  from  the 
broader  history-of-thought  tradition  solely  because  of  the  dogged  and 
uncompromising way in which it employs the broader tradition’s two main 
features. The first of these two features is the use of detailed historical research 
into  a  particular  use  of  law  in  early  modern  Europe,  by  which  law  was 
combined with  a pointedly restricted understanding of Western morality  — 
broadly,  Judeo-Christian  morality  plus  some  features  of  ancient  Greek  and 
Roman morality plus the secular forms developed from this package — in a 
bid to stop the carnage being caused by religious wars, fought over competing 
visions of morality, and to prevent the recurrence of such wars, particularly in 
cases where they had developed into full-scale civil wars. The second feature 
is  the deployment of this  and other historical evidence  in polemics  against 
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traditions that impose on the past and the present an over-arching philosophical 
position, or theory, of law-morality, often in the service of arguments against 
the idea of law as a neutral instrument used to attain civil peace — arguments 
sometimes known as ‘critique’. 
The fight against critique is certainly one intellectual battle in which the 
Australian sceptical approach stands out. Hunter traces the practice of critique 
back  to  some  metaphysical  philosophers’  reactions  against  the  work  of  the 
early  modern  law-as-an-instrument-to-attain-civil-peace  thinkers.  These 
reactions, he argues, were built around the ‘Christian-Platonic pursuit of pure 
rational  being’,  a  pursuit  ‘that  drove  metaphysical  philosophy  for  Liebniz 
through Wolff to Kant and beyond’. Hunter distances his position from that of 
any  critical  intellectual  who  ‘views  the  past  in  terms  of  the  unreconciled 
oppositions  —  between  rationalism  and  voluntarism,  intellectualism  and 
empiricism — and finds his or her own ethical impulse in the need to repeat 
the  moment  of  their  Kantian  reconciliation’.
8  Saunders,  calling  such 
intellectuals ‘the new clergy of Enlightened critics’, argues that in practising 
critique, they work to create ‘a space of conscience … as a zone of private 
freedom’, one that is supposedly ‘beyond the reach of the State and law … 
their own “moral interior”’. One of the weapons these moral critics wield so 
successfully, he continues, is the idea of ‘a moral “society”, counterposed to 
the political State and projected in utopian images of future moral community 
and transformed humanity’.
9 In this way, they achieve much of their success 
by denying any history to their projects, presenting themselves instead as ‘the 
disinterested  voice  of  universal  morality,  not  as  one  moral  faction  among 
others’.
10 Saunders is very keen that these ‘heirs of their confessional forbears’ 
learn a vital ‘history lesson’: ‘When the early modern administrative State lost 
civil governance to spiritual salvation, all were engulfed by a war that none 
knew how to end.’ Furthermore, he wants them to recognise the importance of 
the  ‘de-theologising  programme  that  separated  religion  from  government, 
morality from law, theology from public administration’.
11 
In using works by Hunter and Saunders as  the basis of the Australian 
sceptical  approach  to  law-morality,  I  am  keen  to  confront  the  trend  in  the 
socio-legal academy that would have its members ‘waging continual critical 
war on the early modern attempt to separate moral salvation from civil law and 
government’.
12 I follow these two thinkers in worrying about the continuing 
influence of Kant in this: ‘“Statutes and formulas … those mechanical tools of 
the  rational  employment  of  [man’s]  natural  gifts,  are  the  fitters  of  an 
everlasting  tutelage”  …  Too  tightly  bound  to  worldly  interests  to  carry 
humanity forwards to its truly moral future, positive law is at best a provisional 
substitute  for  inner  morality  and  self-determination.’
13  It  is  as  much  of  a 
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concern to me as it is to Hunter and Saunders that, as the latter puts it: ‘Kant’s 
successors  have  the  scent  of  moral  victory.  When  law  is  reunited  with 
morality, the Absolutist separation of religion from law … is reversed.’ Like 
them, I fear that too many ‘historical jurists have forgotten or never knew why 
Christian conscience was separated from the legal regulation of civil life’.
14 
I stress from  the outset  that  the Australian sceptical  attack on critique 
does not mean that Australian scepticism, or the history-of-thought tradition of 
which it is part, uses its historical research into early modern legal mechanisms 
to  somehow  debunk  Western  morality.  It  is  not  a  Nietzschean  project.  As 
noted above, in treating seriously the history of particular legal mechanisms, 
the broader tradition also treats seriously the operation of Western morality, 
historicising it in the way the relevant early modern thinkers historicised it: not 
to reveal some hitherto hidden flaws of received religions — Hobbes, Hale, 
Pufendorf and Thomasius, being religious men despite occasional charges of 
atheism  against  some  of  them  (particularly  Hobbes),
15  accepted  the  moral 
values they received as vital guides to living and had no interest in any quest to 
condemn morality or, to risk an anachronism, to deconstruct it. These thinkers 
sought  only  to  demonstrate  that  legal  and  political  means  to  restrict  the 
violence flowing from disputes about the best religious route to a perfect after-
life  were  far  superior  to  theological  means,  which  simply  compounded  the 
violence. 
I divide this article into two main sections. In the first, I further introduce 
the  Australian  sceptical  approach  as  part  of  the  broader  history-of-thought 
tradition, with emphasis on its strident character. In the second, I set out some 
features — only a very limited number — of the three established traditions 
and  offer  some  critical  remarks  about  them.  The  remarks  draw  on  the 
Australian sceptical tradition to highlight the limited historical awareness that 
dogs  all  three  traditions  because  of  their  philosophical/theoretical  nature.  I 
hone in especially on the associated reliance on critique, a weakness displayed 
only  by  the  individual  reason-based  and  communitarian  traditions.  In  the 
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conclusion, I assess the more pessimistic arguments of Hunter and Saunders 
about  the  chances  of  their  type  of  arguments  being  heard  in  the  modern 
academy above the din of critique. 
It should be clear from this outline that the article is in no way intended as 
a comprehensive account of each of the three established traditions — a task 
far  beyond  its  scope.  As  noted,  I  deal  with  only  a  few  points  from  these 
traditions, taken from only some representatives of them and I deal with these 
points only  in  enough detail for them  to collectively serve as a vehicle by 
which I can present and promote the Australian sceptical approach. 
Three other points of clarification are necessary before I proceed. First, I 
do not grant to modern critical legal studies the status of a separate approach to 
law-morality,  not  in  its  ‘society-as-morality’  form,
16  its  interpretative  or 
hermeneutic form
17 or its ultra-Romantic ‘aesthetics as anti-aesthetics’ form.
18 
These variations on the critical position are instead treated in the same way as 
the individual reason-based tradition or the communitarian tradition (or both), 
as  ‘heirs  of  their  confessional  forbears’,  taking  up  Saunders’  claim  that: 
‘Critique is religion by other means.’
19 
Second,  I  do  not  make  a  substantial  distinction  between  morality  and 
religion in dealing with the law–morality relation. This is not because I am not 
appreciative of the force of arguments about the need to do so — particularly 
arguments  posed  against  the  utilitarian  approach
20  —  but  because  the 
Australian  sceptical  approach,  as  I  present  it,  effectively  undermines  the 
grounds for such a distinction, as was hinted at above, by arguing that the law–
religion  relations  of  early  Christian,  scholastic,  Anglican,  Lutheran  and 
Calvinist (including Puritan) arguments became, in different ways in different 
countries at different times, the law–morality relation so familiar to the study 
of  law  and  society.  Rather,  I  follow  Hunter  and  Saunders  in  putting  the 
Australian sceptical approach’s energies into distinguishing between, on the 
one hand, the notion of morality posited as a supra-law, supra-state guarantee 
of law and, on the other, those historicised and nuanced accounts of morality 
proposed by the relevant early modern thinkers who sought to contain morality 
by law in such a way as to help maintain civil peace — for example, Hobbes’ 
account,
21 Pufendorf’s account
22 and Thomasius’s account.
23 
Finally, and consequently, I reject the tendency of moral philosophy to 
deride the restricted, historicised morality of these early modern thinkers by 
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21  Hobbes (1962), pp 88–97, 114–29; Leviathan Part I, Chs VI, X, XI. 
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drawing a distinction between what is properly moral and what is prudent or 
instrumental.
24  The  concern  is  misplaced.  The  early  modern  thinkers 
formulated  their  proposals  with  the  sole  aim  of  preventing  people  from 
continuing to kill one another in the name of some moral vision or other. Their 
proposals  helped  to  develop  mechanisms  —  mechanisms  now  sometimes 
known, collectively, as the modern state under the rule of law — which could 
only achieve this aim by remaining neutral towards all such visions. In this 
way, these early modern thinkers deliberately created a norm that was neither 
strictly moral nor strictly prudential. They even developed their own versions 
of what was involved in natural law to help them achieve this. Their accounts 
of natural law were based on the idea that God’s will gave human beings a 
natural inclination  to avoid death and pain but,  in making them voluntarist 
creatures,  did  not  give  them  enough  reason  to  always  act  in  a  manner 
consistent  with  this  inclination.  While  this  limited  amount  of  reason,  these 
early modern accounts had it, is certainly not enough for human beings to fully 
comprehend God’s will, it is enough for them to understand and to seek the 
protection of a strong ruler or sovereign.
25 As such, the ‘but this is not truly 
moral’ objections of moral philosophy are not helpful to an understanding of 
the subject-matter of the Australian sceptical approach. 
The  Australian  Sceptical  Approach  to  Law-morality  as  a  Part  of 
the History-of-thought Tradition 
What I refer to as the broader history-of-thought tradition is sometimes known 
either as history of political thought or intellectual history. Whichever name is 
used, it is a field marked by one or other — sometimes both — of the two 
attributes stressed above: a commitment to the idea that no piece of political 
thought  (which,  for  early  modern  Europe,  necessarily  includes  legal  and 
religious thought) is without its own historical context; and a commitment to 
use the evidence gathered in pursuit of any one or any number of such contexts 
against any attempt to grant to some piece of thought or other the status of a 
timeless universal truth — that is, to grant it immunity from its own particular 
circumstances. The broader tradition began to flourish in the second half of the 
twentieth century as a particular style of the history of ideas, treating political 
thought as political discourses,  as modes of intellectual formation, marking 
itself off from the history of individual thinkers. This is not to say, of course, 
that the more polemical historians of political thought turned their backs on the 
many years of high-quality scholarship in the history of ideas tradition — far 
                                                             
24  For a brief history of some important examples of this widespread philosophical 
reaction, see Hunter (2001), esp pp 364–76. 
25  For  explanations  of  and  samples  from  Hobbes’,  Pufendorf’s  and  Thomasius’s 
accounts of natural law, see Behme (2002); Condren (2002); Haakonssen (1996); 
Hobbes (1962), pp 145–68; Leviathan Part I, Chs XIV–XV; Hunter (2001), pp 85–
96, 171–80, 234–51; Hunter (2004b); Kriegel (2002); Pufendorf (1934), pp 179–
230; De jure naturae et gentium Book II, Ch. 3; Pufendorf (1991), pp 33–38; De 
officio hominis  et civis Book 1, Ch 3. For details of the very particular debate 
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from it. It is to say, however, that they sought to broaden the older tradition so 
that it might have a wider impact. 
An important early marker of the development of the history-of-thought 
tradition, at least for English-language readers, was the publication in 1957 of 
JGA Pocock’s The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, a breakthrough 
text  for  this  approach.
26  Other  important  examples  directly  relevant  to  the 
English-language  study  of  law-morality  include  the  translation  of  Blandine 
Kriegel’s history of morality,
27 the translation of Reinhart Koselleck’s history 
of techniques of critique,
28 the translation of Carl Schmitt’s attack on political 
romanticism,
29 the translation of Noberto Bobbio’s study of Hobbes’ relation 
to  the  natural  law  tradition,
30  Martin  Kriele’s  essay  on  the  nature  of  the 
differences  between  Hobbes  and  Hale,
31  Stephen  Holmes’  essay  on  the 
complexity  of  Bodin’s  sixteenth-century  account  of  sovereignty  and 
toleration
32  and  Hans  Schilling’s  essay  on  what  is  actually  involved  in 
confessionalisation  (a  term  used  by  many  intellectual  historians  to  help 
describe  what  was  actually  involved  in  the  many  different  events  often 
summarised by the term ‘Reformation’).
33 
It will be remembered that I am  claiming that  the Australian sceptical 
approach is marked as a separate approach only by dint of the fact that it is 
especially vehement in its pursuit of its quarry. It is not distinct in wanting to 
break  from  the  history-of-thought  tradition.  Indeed,  Hunter  and  Saunders 
derive much of their polemics against the critics of law and state from among 
these  sources.  To  give  another  taste  of  just  how  vehement  the  Australian 
sceptical approach can be, we can focus for a few moments just on Saunders’ 
Anti-lawyers: Religion and the Critics of Law and State.
34 He takes the history-
of-thought  approach  and,  as  has  already  been  glimpsed,  develops  it  into  a 
powerful  attack  on  the  ‘social  critique  of  law’.  He  husbands  the  historical 
research  provided  by  the  above-listed  sources,  as  well  as  other  historical 
evidence he gathers himself, to establish two propositions. First, law should be 
understood as a means of ‘ordering’ developed in the light of concerns about 
the extraordinary amount of blood-letting going on in early modern Europe — 
in the second half of the sixteenth century, especially in France, and the first 
half  of  the  seventeenth  century,  especially  during  the  Thirty  Years  War  in 
Germany  and  the  Civil  War  in  England  —  to  impose  peace  upon  warring 
religious forces, forces which showed every sign of preferring the destruction 
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British political thought, see especially Pocock (1985, 1988). 
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of entire populations over any settlement which gave theological ground to 
their enemies. Second, this way of understanding law should be seen to be in 
direct  opposition  to  (especially)  the  individual  reason-based  and 
communitarian  approaches  to  the  law–morality  relation,  which  have  never 
stopped trying to undermine it: 
After the carnage of religious civil war, in early modern Europe law 
emerged as one of the few non-religious orderings of civil life. Yet the 
separation  of  law  from  religion  has  never  been  complete.  Religious 
fundamentalists  and  critical  intellectuals  alike  persist  in  seeking  to 
realign  the  conduct  of  government  and  the  legal  apparatus  in 
accordance with moral principle  — whether  individual or  communal 
self-determination.
35 
In  this  way,  for  Saunders,  while  the  creation  of  this  type  of  law  as 
‘ordering’ was ‘an exceptional accomplishment’ in ‘a proselytising religious 
culture’, today it is still an incomplete accomplishment, ‘our own unfinished 
business’. The ‘separation of spiritual discipline from secular government and 
conscience from law was never complete’. While one of the culprits behind 
this  ‘unfinished  business’  is  undoubtedly  religious  fundamentalism,  in  the 
Western intellectual world another culprit needs to be confronted: ‘the more 
refined  yet  no  less  incessant  claims  of  critical  intellectuals  to  reshape 
governmental institutions and the legal apparatus in accordance with a moral 
principle, typically some vision of individual autonomy or communitarian self-
determination’.
36 
In line with this, Saunders goes on to argue that all purveyors of social 
critique of law (read moral critique) have successfully dehistoricised their very 
own persona — the critic. They see themselves, and are widely seen, as the 
true representatives of universal and timeless ‘humanity’, not at all as figures 
‘unable to find a place’ in the operations of the state, not at all as those who 
thrive in ‘safe and elegant settings’ as they develop ‘that habit of mind that 
criticises the State that supports it’, not at all as those unable to face the fact 
that without the state and the law they so deplore, they would have ‘no secure 
platform from which to project their vision of a new society and to preach their 
faith in redemptive moral politics’.
37 
What the critics have succeeded in fixing in place, as was suggested in the 
introduction, is ‘the image of a moral society beyond the reach of the State’, a 
society grounded ‘in inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms. Stripped of 
its historical role as the grantor and protector of religious freedom, the State 
was  recast  as  the  great  threat  to  freedom.’
38  The  critics  have  ‘reoriented 
themselves to a future society where morality would again govern and where 
men, escaping the confines of coercive legal citizenry, would at last be freely 
                                                             
35  Saunders (1997), p i. 
36  Saunders (1997), p viii. 
37  Saunders (1997), p 9, quoting Koselleck. 
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themselves’.
39 In this way, critics have learned to promote their idea of ‘the 
individual  moral  conscience  …  as  the  ultimate  site  of  an  uncompromising 
universal adjudication’ and their idea of having ‘a moral society … supersede 
the administrative State’, and they have learned that the best way to promote 
these  ideas  is  to  produce  ‘a  constant  moral  dissatisfaction  with  existing 
institutions’, institutions they condemn as unworthy, when measured against 
‘images of a future moral society’.
40 
Three  Established  Traditions  of  Studying  Law-morality  and  the 
Australian Sceptical Challenge 
In this section, I repeat, I am outlining some aspects of the three established 
traditions by which to study law-morality and criticising them, both for the 
limited  historical  awareness  associated  with  their  philosophical/theoretical 
approaches and, in the first two cases, for their reliance on critique. 
The  defining  feature  of  the  post-Kantian  individual  reason-based 
approach to the  law–morality relation is the idea that societies  can only be 
properly  formed  and  governed  along  the  lines  of  a  consensus  reached  by 
individuals,  qua  individuals,  on  the  basis  of  their  universally  shared  yet 
individual reason. This is to say that when the individuals come together to 
form  the  crucial  consensus,  they  do  not  lose  their  individuality  —  the 
collective  never  dominates  the  individual.  It  is  in  this  light  that  we  must 
approach Rawls’ remark that ‘a society is well-ordered when it is not only 
designed to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively 
regulated by a public conception of justice’.
41 If law is to be truly in the service 
of a morality driven by individual human reason, it must, according to Rawls, 
be consistent with the ‘public conception of justice’ — understood, of course, 
in individual terms.
42 This notion — an individual-centred ‘public conception 
of justice’ — is thus the key to Rawls’ method of ensuring that law is always 
subservient to morality. By Rawls’ influential account, morality, while sourced 
entirely in individual human reason, only gains its force by the fact that such 
reason leads many of its holders — those who have developed their reason 
thoroughly within themselves — into forming a rational consensus, the very 
basis of society and its government, and therefore its law. Rawls’ argument is 
that  society,  government  and  law  exist  only  inasmuch  as  fully  reasoning 
individuals come together and achieve a consensus so strong that every one of 
them,  as  individuals,  ‘accepts  and  knows  that  the  others  accept  the  same 
principles of justice’ and that ‘the basic social institutions generally satisfy and 
are  generally  known  to  satisfy  these  principles’.
43  As  Rawls  says  of  his 
remarkable  notion,  ‘one  may  think  of  a  public  conception  of  justice  as 
constituting the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association’.
44 
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It might be thought that in Political Liberalism,
45 a book published over 
20 years after the first edition of A Theory of Justice appeared, Rawls backed 
away from his commitment to the centrality of fully reasoning individuals. It is 
certainly the case that he put more emphasis in this book on the role of the 
state  than  he  had  in  A  Theory  of  Justice.  In  the  later  book  he  argues,  in 
pragmatically insisting on the right over the good, that the state must maintain 
civil  peace  by  actively  remaining  neutral  in  contests  between  different 
conceptions of the good.
46 Furthermore, he says that the question of whether or 
not the idea of fully reasoning individuals is central ‘depends on whether we 
can learn and understand it, on whether we can apply and affirm its principles 
and ideals in political life, and on whether we find the political conception of 
justice to which it belongs acceptable on due reflection’.
47 But this apparent 
backing  away  is  just  that  —  apparent.  Behind  the  state’s  neutrality,  even 
behind  this  suggestion  that  we  might  take  or  leave  the  centrality  of  fully 
reasoning individuals, none other than the figure of the truly fully reasoning 
individual still stands. Just look at how the ‘we’ who is asked to do the taking 
or leaving, the ‘we’ who is invited  to recognise  and approve of the state’s 
neutrality is characterised. This is Rawls’ ‘super we’ — the philosophically 
aware super-reasoning individuals. Those whose reasoning capacities let them 
down, briefly or forever, might well choose not to accept the centrality of the 
idea of the fully reasoning individual, might well choose not to give their ‘due’ 
consideration and approval to the neutral state, acting on the behalf of those 
who are wise enough to give their blessing to it. No damage will be done. They 
can be acknowledged by the philosophical cognoscenti, their right to stop at 
insufficiently  ‘due’  reflection  recognised,  for  all  that  is  really  needed  in 
Rawls’s schema is the cognoscenti, the super-reasoning individuals. 
The  post-Thomist  communitarian  tradition  also  believes  a  consensus 
formed  using  human  reason  is  at  the  centre  of  the  law–morality  relation. 
However, for thinkers in this tradition, individual reason is just a beginning-
point: it can never be more than that. For them, reason has a role in morality 
only  when  it  is  expressed  collectively,  as  a  community.  The  community 
consensus decides which moral goods are the driving force, and objects, of 
law, leaving the individuals to play a very minor role. Indeed, the thinkers in 
this tradition insist that individuals be seen only as community members. It is 
because  of  this  focus  that  the  communitarian  thinkers  are  critical  of  the 
individual  reason-based  thinkers,  believing  them  to  be  too  rationalistic,  too 
much focused on individuals. MacIntyre criticises Rawls in just these terms.
48 
For MacIntyre, moral goods like justice are only available via participation in a 
community, the only force that can possibly decide what morality is.
49 The 
law’s  purpose,  for  the  communitarian  tradition,  is  imposing  communally 
determined morality. 
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The idea that law might have a role as a neutral force for achieving social 
peace by actually preventing  each and  every community  from imposing its 
particular morality on the others is anathema to communitarian thinkers, just as 
much as it ultimately anathema to the thinkers of the individual reason-based 
tradition to have the law play this role over and above individuals. This feature 
of the communitarian tradition can best be seen in the work of Cotterrell, a 
leading  communitarian  socio-legal  scholar.  Cotterrell  insists  that  ‘law’s 
ultimate authority’ lies in the morality of the community. He urges his readers 
to ‘reassert links between law and morality, viewing morality as the varied 
conditions  of  solidarity  necessary  to  the  diverse  kinds  of  relations  of 
community that comprise the social’ and, even more, to engage in a ‘powerful 
moral critique of law’.
50 
The Australian sceptical approach, as I am building it, seeks to undermine 
the notion that this level of reason is a universally shared attribute of human 
beings, whether as individual reason or community reason, by historicising it. 
This  approach  traces  the  idea  of  universal  reason  back  to  the  ancient, 
particularly Platonic, premise of homo-duplex. By the homo-duplex premise, as 
Hunter summarises it,
51 humans have two natures: a sensuous nature, by which 
they  experience  empirical  realities;  and  a  rational  or  intelligible  nature,  by 
which they reason, crucially  allowing them  the capacity to rise above  their 
‘other’, baser, empirical nature. Referring to homo-duplex, or at least to a key 
aspect of it, by the term ‘quasi-Platonic moral cosmology’, Hunter is especially 
keen for his readers to see what was made of this premise in its seventeenth 
century  Christian-metaphysical  revival,  through  the  work  of  Leibniz  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  and  especially  the  work  of  Kant  in  the  eighteenth 
century.
52 It is not too difficult, I argue, to see the vital role homo-duplex plays 
in the thinking of adherents of both the individual reason-based approach to 
law-morality and the community reason-based communitarian approach. After 
all,  in  exploring  the  question  of  how  ‘the  figure  of  the  community  of 
intelligible beings’ became so widespread: 
Kantians — from Kant himself through to modern American Kantians 
such as Wood, Rawls and Korsgaard — have answered this question in 
a remarkably uniform manner. They argue that all individuals are led to 
this figure of thought because humans simply are sensuously affected 
rational beings, which means that all must experience the inner conflict 
between  their  participation  in  rational  willing  and  the  distractions  of 
their sensuous inclinations.
53 
The direction of my Australian sceptical arguments on this front is clear 
enough: the notion of universal supreme reason, individual and community, is 
an intellectual device which, like all other intellectual devices, has a history 
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and limits. As such, its claim to the status of supra-empirical universal bedrock 
should be taken as a marker of its Platonic and Kantian heritage, not of its 
close  fit  with  the  nature  of  the  universe.  Hunter  argues  that  ‘such  moral 
anthropologies as homo duplex’ are best seen, ‘not as reflexive recoveries of a 
universal  moral  identity,  but  as  instruments  of  self-problematisation 
preparatory  to  particular  kinds  of  self-cultivation  or  spiritual  grooming’.
54 
From here, I suggest, it is easy enough to see the role the homo-duplex device 
actually does play: 
The role of the homo duplex figure is to induct those exposed to it into a 
particular way of relating to themselves, namely, as beings capable of 
pure rational intuition and self-governance but distracted by sensuous 
inclinations and desires. Transmitted to university students via accounts 
of the limits of the human understanding and will  —  in comparison 
with a divine mind and ‘holy’ will — this way of relating to the self is 
designed to induce a particular kind of self-dissatisfaction: how galling 
that  my  capacity  for  pure  moral  willing  should  be  corrupted  by  my 
sensuous inclinations. This induced metaphysical pathos is in turn the 
stimulus to a work of intellectual self-refinement, imagined in terms of 
transcendence  of  the  lower  sensuous  self  and  participation  in  the 
community of rational beings. The result is the spiritual grooming of the 
metaphysician,  culturally  recognised  as  a  personage  whose  inner 
rational self-purification has given him access to the ‘higher’ noumenal 
standpoint of a being no longer mired in the world of space, time and 
sensuous interests.
55 
In  this  way,  for  me,  every  adherent  of  the  individual  reason-based 
approach  to  the  law–morality  relation,  such  as  Rawls,
56  as  well  as  every 
theorist of the communitarian tradition, should be seen to be people taking on a 
‘culturally recognised persona’, one which allows them to assume that their 
own  ‘inner  rational  self-purification’  has  given  them  access  to  a  ‘higher’ 
standpoint, to assume that they are ‘no longer mired in the world of space, time 
and sensuous interests’ as they go about the business of imposing a particular 
vision of morality on the instrumental operation of law. 
An  Australian  sceptical  argument  that  I  would  apply  to  the  individual 
reason-based tradition alone is one that historicises the notion of the public 
conception of  justice, showing  that  Rawls’  approach  actually side-steps  the 
empirical history of its own assumptions about ‘public’. In this way, I would 
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56  In  presenting  an  Australian  sceptical  response  to  Rawls’  formulations,  it  is 
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have  this  argument  undermine  claims  by  the  proponents  of  the  individual 
reason-based approach that this notion, too, is universal. That is, I would use it 
to deny claims like Rawls’ that the notion is ‘implicit in the public political 
culture of a democratic society’.
57 In other words, where the individual reason-
based approach seeks to provide a philosophical basis for the universality of 
what it calls ‘public’, I would counter with historical arguments drawn from 
the Australian sceptical approach. These historical arguments would thereby 
be offered in support of a quite different notion of the ‘public’, one which 
encapsulates the idea that law was and remains the main public weapon of a 
bid to put an end to the public expressions of religious feelings which were, in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, intended to give people the strength to 
kill, in the name of the salvation of those killed as well as those doing the 
killing.
58  For  the  Australian  sceptical  approach,  of  course,  this  remarkable 
legal effort was an empirical achievement, not a metaphysical one. As such, it 
cannot be taken to be the basis of a philosophical account of the nature of 
‘public’, a ‘general theory’ of ‘public’. Instead, I suggest, the best that can be 
done — and this is the best that the Australian sceptical approach can ever do, 
being,  I  stress  again,  a  historical  approach  rather  than  a  philosophical  or 
theoretical one
59 — is to retrieve the details of the achievement, highlighting 
the differences in its form in different countries and highlighting its fragility 
and partiality, in a bid to prevent it being taken for granted. 
One example will have to suffice here, to do with the formation of a legal 
conscience in England. 
The English Calvinists of the early seventeenth century, Saunders tells us, 
sought to impose their own form of polity above the civil polity, in their bid to 
build a new ‘“sphere of relations” … relations [that] were to be “the model for 
all  social  life”’.
60  The  Puritans,  as  they  have  come  to  be  known,  were 
determined  that  ‘the  courts  of  men  and  their  authorities’  be  always  ‘under 
conscience’.
61  The  effect  of  the  Puritan  intention,  Saunders  argues,  was  to 
subordinate ‘Positive law … to Christian conscience’.
62 For Saunders, while 
the  ‘Puritan  lifestyle  produced  remarkable  men  and  women,  able  to  set  … 
themselves above the worldly sphere’ by great discipline and restraint, their 
success  in  promoting  the  idea  that  they  were  ‘a  law  unto  themselves’  was 
equally a success in promoting the idea that ‘existing law’ can never have ‘an 
authentic ethical value of its own’.
63 He quotes Thomas to help show that the 
label  ‘Age  of  Conscience’  is  appropriate  as  a  description  of  seventeenth 
century  England:  ‘For  much  of  the  century  it  was  generally  believed  that 
conscience, not force of habit or self-interest, was what held together the social 
and political order … Every attempt by the State to prescribe the forms of 
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religious doctrine and worship tested the consciences of those who believed it 
was their duty to obey the laws of the land but were also persuaded of the truth 
of a rival creed’.
64  
Against this supra-social, supra-political, supra-state notion of conscience 
was  pitted  the  alternative  notion  advanced  by  Hobbes  and  by  Lord 
Nottingham, among others: ‘a conscience that was strictly “civil and political”, 
namely pacific and prudent’.
65 On the one hand, then, was a religious-moral 
conscience ‘regulated by the “truth of a creed”’, while on the other was a legal 
conscience,  ‘regulated  by  the  “laws  of  the  land”’.
66  The  legal  type  of 
conscience  was  developed  over  several  centuries.  Saunders  focuses  on  the 
influence  of  the  publication,  in  1528  and  1530,  of  two  dialogues  by 
Christopher St German, ‘a barrister of the Middle Temple in London’, under 
the title Doctor and Student. St German deliberately set out ‘to demonstrate 
that the common law rather than the decrees of the church should govern the 
consciences of Englishmen’.
67 St German’s basic argument eventually became 
widely accepted in the common-law milieu and, by the end of the sixteenth 
century, Selden, Hale and Lord Nottingham were all arguing forcefully about 
the need to keep religious conscience out of the law.
68 It was, at least in part, 
on the basis of the official separation of law from religious conscience in the 
court  of  equity  that  the  law’s  ‘positivity’  was  founded:  ‘This  self-limiting 
conscience of the court is the law’s positivity, its delimitation of its jurisdiction 
and its objects of administration.’
69  
This  separation,  it  must  be  remembered,  was  achieved  in  a  climate  in 
which  ‘Christian  enthusiasms  …  sought  to  impose  confessional  conscience 
across  the  whole  of  life’.  It  was  clearly  no  mean  achievement,  making  it 
‘possible to adjudicate legally rather than confessionally’.
70 As Saunders says, 
with considerable understatement, it ‘merits our appreciation’.
71  
An  Australian  sceptical  argument  that  I  would  apply  to  the 
communitarian tradition alone is one concerned to build on the point I have 
made quite a few times, albeit obliquely, that ‘community’ more often than not 
refers to a ‘community of souls’, to ‘moral community’. This is to say that, 
more often than not, ‘community’ refers to that force which the law had to deal 
with in the early modern era in order to achieve and maintain civil peace: ‘The 
population of citizens was overwhelmed by the community of souls’ such that 
the  state  had  to  separate  itself  from  the  church,  to  ‘de-confessionalise’  its 
domain.
72  I  would  use  this  argument,  with  the  support  of  the  historical 
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evidence  the  Australian  sceptical  approach  provides,  to  demonstrate  the 
lengths to which early modern thinkers like Pufendorf and Thomasius had to 
go  to  take  the  law  out  of  the  hands  of  ‘the  community’.  Perhaps  the  best 
example is the determination of these two German thinkers to help found a 
new body of law, one designed precisely to ensure that the church could not 
dominate the state, one which served a form of sovereignty restricted ‘to the 
purely  worldly  domination  of  a  territory’,  a  new  form  of  natural  law  that 
became a new form of public law.
73 
In the foreword to his 1707 translation of Grotius for a German audience, 
Hunter  tells  us,  Thomasius  focused  especially  on  ‘jus  publicum  and 
Staatsrecht’, or public law of the state.
74 Hunter pays particular attention to the 
form  of  Staatsrecht  that  both  Pufendorf  and  Thomasius  intended  would 
completely  separate  state  from  church,  ‘the  theologically  indifferent 
Staatskirchenrecht’: 
It was indeed through the protracted elaboration of the political-legal 
instruments required to deal with the religious civil war that German 
political or public law … gradually became independent of Roman law, 
employing  the  latter’s  categories  for  the  scaffolding  for  these  great 
works  of  legal  construction,  but  filling  them  with  contents  suited  to 
purposes unknown to the Roman legists.
75 
This move effectively ‘detached German jus publicam from all higher-level 
moral and theological ends, thereby allowing it to be treated as a set of purely 
instrumental commands required to achieve social peace’.
76 
Before we leave the communitarian tradition and move to the utilitarian 
tradition,  I  want  to  stress  how  important  Cotterrell  thinks  it  is  that 
communitarian accounts of law-morality be posed as ‘theories’, specifically ‘to 
address the nature of contemporary law’, to help law ‘to map and organize the 
sociolegal  realm’.
77  He  does  not,  of  course,  supply  a  discussion  of  the 
historical circumstances in which the idea of separating theory and fact was 
generated,  believing  theory  to  be  universal  and  timeless.  In  fact,  as  I  have 
suggested, these circumstances had much to do with the attempt by philosophy 
to impose itself as a universal, timeless means of knowing. As a ready guide to 
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the Australian sceptical response to any demand for such theories — which 
will always, remember, be a historically based approach — a one-line point 
from Saunders is hard to beat: ‘Theories that would transcend circumstance 
have  …  their  own  circumstantial  conditions.’
78  From  this  perspective,  of 
course, ‘the theorist’ becomes a figure who announces his or her presence by 
‘claiming to see the hidden structure of underlying rules that the pre-theoretical 
[investigator] does not even know to look for’.
79 
It is this line of Australian sceptical criticism, I argue, that best fits the 
utilitarian tradition. This tradition, as was noted in the introduction, is as keen 
as the Australian sceptical approach to have law stand on its feet and not bow 
down to morality, as the other two established traditions demand it should. But 
where the utilitarians are pointedly philosophical — seeking to build a general 
philosophical  or  theoretical  means  to  show  how  law  and  morality  can  and 
should  be  separated  —  the  Australian  sceptical  approach  is  situational, 
empirical and historical, in the ways we have seen. Let us now turn to some 
details about the utilitarian tradition, by way of brief summaries of each of a 
work  by  Austin  and  a  work  by  Hart,  and  to  a  detailed  example  which 
demonstrates  how  different  the  Australian  sceptical  approach  is  from  its 
utilitarian cousin. 
Austin’s  foundational  Province  of  Jurisprudence  Determined,
80  first 
published in 1832, is a treatise born of the utilitarian philosophical project, yet 
with  clear  political  intent  —  ‘Bentham  and  Austin  were  not  dry  analysts 
fiddling with verbal distinctions while cities burned, but were the vanguard of 
a movement which  laboured with passionate  intensity and much success  to 
bring about a better society and better laws’.
81 Austin’s book, surely one of the 
more  methodical  texts  ever  produced,  distinguishes  the  ground  of  both  a 
general and a particular jurisprudence — each of which deal with positive laws 
— from the ground occupied by any one of the following three categories, 
with which jurisprudence is too often confused: ‘The divine laws, or the laws 
of God: that is to say, the laws which are set by God to his human creatures’; 
‘Positive  morality, rules of positive morality, or positive  moral rules’;  and, 
‘Laws metaphysical or figurative’.
82 
Hart’s famous essay ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’
83 
is  a  clear  exposition  of  the  separation  of  law  and  morality  by  which  the 
tradition is usually defined. Hart is sure that Bentham and Austin did not reject 
‘the intersection of law and morals’, for example accepting that ‘many legal 
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rules mirrored moral rules or principles’.
84 Instead, they insisted on only two 
things: ‘it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule violated standards of 
morality that it was not a rule of law; and, conversely, it could not follow from 
the mere fact that a rule was morally desirable that it was a rule of law’.
85 He 
goes on to defend the tradition in terms of its separation of law from morals, its 
‘purely analytical study of legal concepts’ and its use of the ‘imperative theory 
of law — that law is essentially a command’.
86 
The rigorous philosophical nature of both these thinkers’ projects is plain 
to see. While neither is a stranger to history, using it often, they always use it 
only to buttress their philosophical approaches —  in Austin’s case,  to help 
build a guide to jurisprudence that will be good for all circumstances. One of 
the clearest examples of Hart’s commitment to philosophy comes in one of his 
discussions of/replies to critics of utilitarianism, which are dotted throughout 
his piece, in this case Radbruch’s objection that Nazi law was so immoral it 
could not be called law. Hart argues that a law can be disobeyed because it is 
immoral but it is still a law, leaving the distinction between law and morality 
intact.
87 Hart fails to see the possibility of dealing with the separation between 
law  and  morality  in  purely  historical  terms  —  as  an  artefact  of  particular 
moves around the de-theologisation of the civil sphere for the sole purpose of 
achieving and maintaining civil peace, in particular ways in particular places. 
Hart, like Austin and Bentham before him, is not prepared to let the historical 
evidence  stand  as  proof  that  the  separation  of  law  and  morality  was  and 
remains  entirely  empirical,  with  no  lessons  to  be  learned  for  the  sake  of 
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sociological theory is Bauman 1989. Saunders gathers evidence to establish that 
the  ‘“Utopian  self-exultation”’  of  the  Nazis,  the  source  of  their  ‘“hitherto 
unprecedented crimes”’, was a product not of their adherence to the separation of 
law  and  morality,  but  to  their  total  rejection  of  this  tradition  (Saunders,  1997, 
p 143,  quoting  Koselleck).  ‘The  Nazi  political  regime  viciously  attacked  the 
professional neutrality of German State lawyers and bureaucrats for following “an 
enterprise  ...  empty  of  moral  worth”  and  a  “merely  external  and  formalistic 
concept of duty” ... With the Nazi seizure of power ... an overwhelming moral and 
political fervour “superseded the conventional dualism of state and society, as well 
as the separation of powers and the positivist tradition in private and public law”’ 
(Saunders, 1997, p 143, quoting Caplan). 44  GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2006) VOL 15 NO 1 
humanity, no general philosophical import — though, of course, with long-
standing and continuing practical import. 
A  useful  way  to  illustrate  this  important  distinction  between  an 
intellectual means to build a universal system for separating law and morality 
on the one hand, and a more situational, relevant-only-to-some-circumstances-
in-some-places account of some instances of its separation on the other, is to 
recall  aspects of the exchange between Hobbes and Hale  over the former’s 
attack  on  the  common  law  in  his  Dialogue  Between  a  Philosopher  and  a 
Student of the Common Laws of England. As Hobbes’ command theory of law 
is a touchstone of the utilitarian tradition, Hobbes’ side of the exchange can be 
taken to be a prototype of this tradition’s way of approaching law-morality, 
while  Hale  is,  albeit  on  this  matter  only,  a  more  important  figure  for  the 
Australian sceptical approach to law-morality than is Hobbes. 
Saunders pays much attention to Hale’s direct response to Hobbes — his 
‘Reflections on Mr Hobbes his Dialogue of the Lawe’, widely circulated and 
debated  as  a  response  to  the  even  more  widely  circulated  and  debated 
Dialogue
88 — to establish two joint propositions. The first proposition is that, 
where Hale treats ‘the common law as a definite but limited exercise of reason, 
inseparable from the uses which historically constituted that particular legal 
conduct  …  Hobbes  was  less  the  positive  realist  …  than  a  philosophical 
fundamentalist promulgating a normative order abstracted from circumstance’. 
The  second  is  that,  ‘Where  Hobbes  treats  particular  practices  that  are 
transparent to a reason that is universal, Hale sees particular conducts that are 
distinguished by their locally “habituated use and Exercise” of reason’.
89 
In  line  with  these  propositions,  Saunders  highlights  some  of  the  more 
extreme propositions Hobbes puts in the mouth of his Philosopher, such as the 
one that claimed ‘that, thanks to his natural reason, he could master the legal 
art in no time at all’ — ‘within a Month, or two make my self able to perform 
the  Office  of  a  Judge’.
90  Hale  was  able  to  counter  this  point  by  reversing 
‘Hobbes’ dismissal of existing law as an inferior practice of reason’: ‘Taking 
up the cause of law’s technical reason … the prudential Hale is proof against 
perfectionist claims.’
91 He provides a quote from Hale to back up this vital 
point: 
The  Inconvenience  of  an  Arbitrary  is  intollerable,  and  therefore  a 
certain Lawe, though accompanied with some mischiefe, is preferrable 
                                                             
88  Saunders  (1997),  pp  40–41.  The  practice  of  widely  circulating  and  debating 
important arguments in preference to, or preparatory to, publishing them was quite 
common at the time. Hobbes’ Dialogue was not printed until 1681, two years after 
he died and six years after Hale died, while Hale’s ‘Reflections’ was not printed 
— despite its wide currency in the late seventeenth century and to some extent 
since — until 1921 (Saunders, 1997, p 159, n 6). Hale’s ‘Reflections’ is available 
as  an  appendix  to  one  of  the  volumes  of  Holdsworth’s  history  of  English  law 
(Holdsworth, 1945). 
89  Saunders (1997), pp 41–42. 
90  Hobbes (1971), p 56. 
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before  itt.  But  it  is  not  possible  for  any  humane  thing  to  be  wholly 
perfect.
92  
Hale  comes  out  on  top  here,  this  is  to  say,  not  by  countering  Hobbes’ 
philosophy-to-provide-all-the-answers with a common-law version of the same 
thing,  but  by  doing  precisely  the  opposite.  For  Hale,  ‘common  law  reason 
offers  no  …  magic  instant.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  slow  and  unplanned 
aggregate of many judgments.’
93 
In his points against Hobbes, Hale might just as well be commenting on 
the great theorist’s modern-day heirs in the utilitarian tradition: ‘There is no 
short cut to lawyerly competence via “Theoryes”. The alternative to theoretical 
breakthrough is more arduous and less exciting.’
94 In other words, ‘the limits 
to the practice of English legal reason are no disadvantage, given the particular 
purpose of that reason’.
95 For Hale, as for so many other common lawyers, 
‘much reading, observation and study’, along with ‘administrative function and 
professional  routines’,  provide  the  practice  of  law  with  more  than  enough 
coherence and consistency, ‘a ground in principle of foundation in theory’ is 
unnecessary.
96 
Conclusion 
Are Saunders and Hunter right to feel pessimistic about the chances of their 
type of arguments being more widely adopted in the law-and-society academy 
or in the humanities academy? To help provide some context for an answer, 
here are four brief examples of expressions of doubt from Saunders, one of 
them echoing Koselleck’s doubt, and one from Hunter:  
This will not find easy acceptance, given our own constant exposure — 
through German Romanticism and critical theory — to moral criticism 
of the State.
97 
If  Koselleck  is  right,  with  ever  more  students  trained  by  critical 
intellectuals … there will be a persisting religious revenge on existing 
institutions.
98  
those few … who argue for an anti-theocratic plurality of ‘orderings of 
life’ … risk rejection in a humanities academy more theological than it 
knows.
99 
                                                             
92  Saunders (1997), pp 43–44, quoting Hale. 
93  Saunders (1997), p 44. 
94  Saunders (1997), p 44, quoting Hale. 
95  Saunders (1997), p 44. 
96  Saunders (1997), p 45, quoting Hale. 
97  Saunders (1997), p 85. 
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The separation of law and morality is anathema in an academic milieu 
where moral rules and political principles are taken as the proper basis 
for law and government.
100 
For his part, Hunter is concerned that, especially because they are based 
on the retrieval of a ‘bleak  Epicurean’ cosmology ‘suited to  a  Europe still 
dealing with the aftermath of a period of protracted religious warfare’, the type 
of  arguments  he  employs  will  be  ‘unfamiliar  and  hostile’  to  most  modern 
readers.
101 
As  a  preamble  to  my  answer,  as  to  whether  the  two  thinkers  are  too 
pessimistic, I point out that all of the remarks reproduced immediately above 
were composed and published before the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington took place, let alone those in Bali, Madrid and London. At that 
time, I suggest, it was a reasonable of them to guess that the reception of their 
approach would be forever coloured by the tendency of most people in the 
academy  to see human beings  as  morally worthy and ultimately deserving, 
rather than as fundamentally dangerous. 
In the light of my judgment that the intellectual climate has changed, even 
if only marginally, such that their type of thinking will now be allowed a better 
hearing than it could have hoped for five years ago, my answer is to say, with 
some trepidation, that Hunter and Saunders are not right to be so pessimistic. 
Maybe now there is more room in the academy for their type of arguments, 
which I have here fashioned into  an ‘approach’ — more  room, that  is, for 
arguments  dedicated  to  the  retrieval  and  re-presentation  of  some  legal  and 
political  thinking  that  succeeded  in  limiting  widespread  killing  born  of 
competing  moral  visions,  where  strictly  moral  thinking  had  only  made  the 
situation worse. It would be rash to go any further than ‘maybe’, so that will 
have to do. 
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